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The nature of openness in government continues to be explored by academics and pub-
lic managers alike while accountability is a fact of life for all public services. One of the 
last bastions of ‘closed government’ relates to the ‘secret’ security and intelligence ser-
vices. But even here there have been significant steps towards openness over more than 
two decades.  In Britain the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) of Parliament is 
the statutory body charged with scrutinising the agencies and since 2013 is more ac-
countable itself to Westminster. This was highlighted by the first open evidence sessions 
involving the heads of the agencies which coincided with the unofficial disclosure of 
secret information by way of the so-called ‘WikiLeaks world’. This article examines 
scrutiny as a route to openness. It makes the distinction between accountability and 
open government and argues that the ‘trusted’ status of the ISC in comparison to the 
more independent Parliamentary Select Committees weakens its ability to hold govern-
ment to account but, combined with the claim to privileged information and the acqui-
escence of the agencies, makes its existence much more aligned to the idea of open gov-
ernment 
Keywords - Westminster Select Committees, Intelligence and Security Committee, MI5 
and MI6, scrutiny of public agencies. 
INTRODUCTION 
When the three heads of Britain’s security and intelligence services, Sir Iain Lobban 
(Director of GCHQ), Andrew Parker (Director General of MI5) and Sir John Sawers 
(Chief of MI6), appeared in Westminster on 7 November 2013, a new marker was set 
for open government. But it was also about accountability. This was a significant event 
representing the first ever open evidence session for Parliament’s Intelligence and Secu-
rity Committee and the first time Parliamentarians had enjoyed the opportunity to pub-
licly question spy chiefs.  
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Official disclosure of Britain’s security and intelligence agencies has come a long way 
since the first blurred images of MI5 Director General Stella Rimington were published 
in the early 1990s by the New Statesman.  Indeed prior to the Security Services Act 
(1989), British governments denied the existence of the Security Service (MI5) and it 
took until 1994 to acknowledge the existence of the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6).  
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) was outed in 1984 when the 
Thatcher government prohibited staff from joining Trades Unions leading to strikes and 
a protracted row.  
Rimington began the process of openness under the watchful eye of the Major admin-
istration but this has also been a journey for parliamentary oversight. The Intelligence 
and Security Committee of Parliament (ISC) was established by the Intelligence Ser-
vices Act (1994). Conducting its affairs behind closed doors and reporting to the prime 
minister (consequently only indirectly to Parliament) the ISC was given the authority to 
examine policy, administration and expenditure of the agencies.  
It was not until the Justice and Security Act (2013) that the ISC became a Committee of 
Parliament, gaining greater powers and extending its remit to include ‘oversight of op-
erational activity and the wider intelligence and security activities of government’ 
(Dawson, 2013). But perhaps overlooked in the spectacle of spy chiefs discussing their 
work in public is the increasing influence of Parliament itself (or at least parliamentari-
ans). Indeed, despite criticisms over its ability to hold government to account (Bochel et 
al, 2013) and evaluations of how effectively Parliament has scrutinised the likes of 
counter-terrorism legislation legislation (Walker & Horne, 2016) , the ISC has estab-
lished itself as a significant actor in making ‘open government’ work.  Here, compari-
sons with the departmental Select Committees are naturally made, especially during 
recent years where they have become more confident in demanding answers from gov-
ernment. Indeed, the work of the ISC operates alongside and in competition with these 
increasingly combative committees.  
There is a wider context.  The ramifications of internet and information technology have 
not only made the work of the agencies more complex, they have also provided oppor-
tunities for unofficial disclosure. The ‘WikiLeaks world’, Edward Snowdon leak and 
Russian hacking allegations demonstrate that irrespective of governments’ willingness 
to manage openness, unofficial actors remain disposed to taking the initiative.   
This article is not an examination of the activities of intelligence agencies, what has 
been revealed or indeed the deliberations of the ISC which has been covered elsewhere 
(Gill, 2007; Leigh, 2007). Nor does it evaluate the effectiveness of oversight which al-
ready has a place in the literature (Gill & Phythian, 2006; Phythian, 2007).  Rather, it 
critiques the significance of these recent developments in parliamentary ‘oversight’. The 
main aim of this article is to assess the extent to which parliamentary scrutiny can be a 
route to openness. The distinction between accountability and openness is central to this 
evaluation and yet is under-explored in the literature. This article burrows into some of 
the workings of the ISC to help draw out key differences. It sets the critique in the con-
text of both unofficial disclosure and developments in Parliamentary Select Committee 
strength. Its distinctiveness, therefore, is largely conceptual in nature.   
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Taking the developing strength of the Select Committees and the ISC becoming a 
Committee of Parliament as its framework, the article analyses oversight from a number 
of perspectives. It sets the developments in the wider context of government accounta-
bility to parliament to comment on the broader trend, definition and understanding of 
open government and whether powers of parliament can always be viewed as public 
participation in the oversight process.  It compares the ISC to the departmental Select 
Committees, to argue that as their power has increased, Select Committees have become 
more focused on scrutiny and accountability and less about openness.  The more com-
pliant nature of the ISC, its trusted status and ‘exclusive’ claim to access and infor-
mation, by contrast, is more closely identified with government.  Its behaviour in scruti-
nising the agencies, while less effective, is nonetheless much more supportive of ‘open 
government’.   
CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, LEAKS AND PARLIAMENT 
To judge the significance of advances in parliamentary oversight of the Intelligence and 
Security services in terms of open government, it is instructive to review two substantial 
contextual developments.  These can be termed as the still emerging ‘Wikileaks world’ 
and the new confidence of Westminster Select Committees.  While these developments 
are separate with distinct origins and consequences, this section argues that unofficial 
openness supports the case for official scrutiny and that combined with broader policies 
encouraging freedom of information, it has also more clearly shaped the role of parlia-
mentary Select Committees towards holding government to account rather than opening 
it up.  
 
WikiLeaks World 
Several scholars have referred to the ‘WikiLeaks world’ (Hood, 2011; Fenster, 2012; 
Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012; Munro 2016; O’Loughlin 2016); shorthand for the new con-
text of classified information freely available courtesy of the eponymous organisation. 
Since its establishment in 2006, WikiLeaks has published thousands of secret docu-
ments ranging from Operating Procedures for Camp Delta to US vice-presidential can-
didate Sara Palin’s emails, membership lists of the far-right British Nationalist Party, 
details of a 2009 Iranian nuclear accident, Bilderberg reports,  documents from col-
lapsed bank Kaupthing,  the ‘Afghan war diary’ comprising some 92,000 documents 
relating to military activities and several thousand US diplomatic cables, to the CIA’s 
‘anti-forensic’ so-called ‘Marble Framework’ (WikiLeaks).   
This ‘WikiLeaks world’ is bigger than a single organisation. A separate episode in-
volved former CIA employee Edward Snowden who, in 2013, downloaded and leaked 
1.7 million secret files to The Guardian and Washington Post including several thou-
sand relating to British Intelligence.  Believed by to be the biggest intelligence theft in 
US history, the US Department of Defense produced a report assessing the impact on 
national security.  This was inevitably classified but one who read it, Chairman of the 
House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Mike Rogers 
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articulated its implications: ‘Snowden’s real acts of betrayal place America’s military 
men and women at greater risk [and] are likely to have lethal consequences for our 
troops in the field.’ (HPSCI, 2014).  Elsewhere, former UK Homeland Security Adviser 
Sir David Omand was widely quoted describing the disclosure as the most ‘catastrophic 
loss to British intelligence ever’ (BBC, 2013). More recently allegations of Russian 
hacking is said to have disrupted the 2016 US presidential election process and released 
thousands of emails written by Democratic candidate  and former Secretary of State 
Hilary Clinton (Follis &Fish, 2017). The potential repercussions of this not only have 
implications for democracy but also for how government handles ‘secret’ information. 
There is little new in the leaking of secret information, something which has bedevilled 
intelligence agencies since they first existed.  Indeed there is an extended, if potted, of-
ficial and unofficial, history which includes such discussion (Andrew, 2009; Thurlow, 
2000; West, 2005b; Vilasi, 2013). Aside from the sheer volume of this recent unofficial 
disclosure, what is new surrounds the global internet technology employed to circum-
vent national laws and the ease with which files can be copied and communicated elec-
tronically.  For this reason governments and intelligence agencies face a brave new 
world rather than simply a new determined adversary.  As Christopher Hood observes: 
‘High volume “outing” of secret material in cyberspace seems unlikely to be just a pass-
ing phase....there does not seem to be much to stop replication of the WikiLeaks “busi-
ness model”’ (2011, 637).   
The implications for sanctioned openness are twofold.  Firstly, governments are incen-
tivised to manage legitimate disclosure of official information by extending Freedom of 
Information programmes to embrace open data initiatives (Hood, 2011; Grimme-
likhuijsen, 2012; Keenan, 2012). Secondly, there is the impact of leaked materials 
which begs the question as to whether disclosure really does have ‘lethal consequences’. 
There are numerous views here. Inkster (2014), for instance, claims that neither Snow-
don himself nor the acquiescing newspapers which published his revelations really un-
derstood the material they had. While O’Loughlin (2016) demonstrates that academics 
engage in ‘self-censorship’ of Wikileaks information.  Dismissing claims made by 
transparency advocates around the benefits of the leaks, Fenster’s detailed study none-
theless concludes that ‘open sources provide no clear evidence that WikiLeaks caused 
significant damage….If we cannot assume or predict the existence of effects from a 
massive disclosure of classified documents, then a core theoretical concept and assump-
tion for the laws governing access to government information are incoherent and con-
ceptually bankrupt.’ (Fenster, 2012, 806). What this means is that where government 
cannot demonstrate that the maintenance of secrecy is essential for national security, 
there will be more compulsion to open up.  
 
Parliamentary Confidence 
Whatever the motivations, there is a further implication for the sovereign body whose 
job it is to hold government, and its agencies, to account: in Britain the Westminster 
Parliament.  Here departmental Select Committees, which since 1979 have had powers 
to call for people and papers, are the organisational apparatus by which permanent over-
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sight of the executive is conducted.  But, as Brazier and Fox observe, ‘committees no 
longer have the privileged access to government information that they could once take 
for granted: the digital communication revolution, Freedom of Information, the range of 
policy analysis undertaken by academia and think tanks…means select committees can-
not afford to rest on their laurels.’ (2011, 355).  
Select Committees can hardly be accused of such complacency having been responsible 
for some of the most effective scrutiny of government over a period popularly consid-
ered to represent the ‘decline of parliament’ (Norton, 2005).  This parliamentary over-
sight has become more professional and better resourced, especially since the adoption 
of core tasks in 2002 following proposals from the Newton Commission on Parliamen-
tary Scrutiny which challenged the balance of power with government (Flinders, 2002; 
Brazier & Fox, 2011). Westminster’s Select Committees have increased their status, 
visibility and power most notably during the 2010 parliament where following the 
Wright Reforms (2009), committee chairs and members were elected by the House for 
the first time (rather than appointed by the whips). Analysis by Dunleavy and Muir 
(2013) confirm popular perception of the growing prestige of Commons’ Select Com-
mittees which saw a tripling of media coverage in the immediate aftermath of reform.  
Inquiries have fed a popular post-credit crunch appetite for accountability. That is they 
can be said to be representing the electorate’s interests.  Here, perceived unfairness 
ranging from bankers’ bonuses to corporate ‘tax dodgers’ to government inefficiencies 
are much less tolerated, Hilary Benn’s ‘Exiting the EU’ Committee has made much of 
the opposition running on this crucial issue, while 24 hour news, online content in all its 
forms and social media ensure the public is better informed than ever. These committees 
have in some ways created public interest with high profile, forthright, investigations; 
they represent one of the more deliberative aspects of the Westminster Model otherwise 
characterised by tribalism and oppositionalism (Barber, 2016). Elsewhere they have 
demanded the right to hold hearings into important public appointments and even ap-
pear to be establishing a right of veto and dismissal as was seen with the new head of 
the Office of Budget Responsibility (Waller & Chalmers, 2010).   
Alas such power has not been extended to the heads of the security and intelligence ser-
vices.  Indeed, Select Committees have continued to be excluded from investigating the 
agencies and this cannot be blamed on apathy.  The Home Affairs and Foreign Affairs 
Select Committees have both at various times staked a claim on monitoring the activi-
ties of MI5 and MI6, each being a function of the Home Office and Foreign Office re-
spectively. Indeed, since the controversy surrounding the invasion of Iraq, MPs have 
shown greater interest in intelligence matters and greater scepticism over government 
communications.  After all, in this unprecedented instance, government published con-
siderable intelligence supporting the existence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction 
which proved to be ‘unreliable’. A mainstream view is that the intelligence communi-
ty’s ‘acceptance of these demands was to prove disastrous’. (West, 2005, 26)   
The Foreign Affairs Committee went so far as to title an investigation into the decision 
to invade Iraq around ‘Government’s Lack of Co-operation’ with the Committee (FAC, 
2004). The executive naturally favoured examination by the more dependable ISC. Such 
criticism compounded earlier comments from the Home Affairs Committee arguing 
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that: ‘we remain concerned that the principle of parliamentary, as opposed to statutory, 
scrutiny of the intelligence and security services has not yet been conceded... We do not 
want to wait for another crisis of confidence of the sort that has occurred in the past 
only to discover that the existing scrutiny arrangements are inadequate.’ (HAC, 1999). 
Indeed when crisis did arise in the form of Iraq, it was an independent inquiry headed 
by insider, Lord Butler a former Cabinet Secretary, which examined the evidence.  
When it comes to security and intelligence, there is justification for expecting insight 
from politicians and government departments.  This is further evidenced by the careful 
words of a one-time MI5 Director General who argues that ‘if you approach questions 
of oversight without understanding the role of the Secretary of State you miss one of the 
key planks of the arrangement. I think it’s right to say that the degree of engagement of 
Ministers in our business has grown exponentially over the last decade’. (Lander, 2001, 
30).  For these and reasons of comparability with the ISC, scholarly connections be-
tween opening up the agencies and the work of the parliamentary Select Committees are 
established in the literature (Bochel et al, 2013; Defty, 2008; Norton, 1998, Phythian, 
2007). This allows for an extension of conceptual understanding. 
 
Accountability not Openess 
The growing professionalism of Select Committees, combined with this opening up of 
information from other legitimate and illegitimate sources, has sought to define their 
role much more acutely (Brazier & Fox, 2011).  This partly revolves around the need 
for information, whether released legitimately or disclosed unofficially ‘to be interpret-
ed before it can be acted upon by interested citizens’ (Davis & Meckel, 2012, 463).  
Since 2010 in particular this has manifested in a greater sense of independence to set 
agendas and ask awkward questions.  Committees can be seen as less compliant and 
more representative of voters. Here, it is instructive to critique the ‘core tasks’ articulat-
ed by the Commons’ Liaison Committee which increasingly represents their focus.  
These are: to examine and comment on departmental policy, expenditure and admin-
istration and to assist the House in debate and decision (HC, 2002).  While there is a 
general duty ‘to monitor the work of the department’s Executive Agencies, NDPBs, 
regulators and other associated public bodies’, the focus and role of Select Committees 
can be interpreted as coalescing around the narrower responsibility to hold government 
to account rather than the broader concept of opening it up. That is they are performing 
a constitutional role, drawing on the sovereign authority of Parliament, to question and 
judge government in return for the maintenance of confidence required to sustain an 
administration.  Parliament in turn is accountable to voters at election time.  
This idea of a duty to inform, explain and justify is essentially what is understood by 
democratic accountability (Davis & Meckel, 2012) but it is subtly different from open-
ness (a distinction underexplored in the literature). Indeed, it is perhaps for this reason 
that the contemporary direction of Select Committees has led Brazier and Fox (2011), in 
revisiting those core responsibilities, to argue for greater accountability towards fellow 
MPs; something which elections by the House goes some way to meeting. 
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In common with other democracies, Britain has stated a commitment to open govern-
ment with the justification that ‘Openness and transparency can save money, strengthen 
people’s trust in government and encourage greater public participation in decision-
making’. And yet none of the several thousand datasets available on its open.gov web-
site relate to the security and intelligence services or the data gathered by GCHQ.   Such 
‘e-government’ is complex but is intended to improve decision making and services by 
fostering collaboration (Naith, 2011; Bannister & Connolly, 2012; Scott, DeLone & 
Golden 2016); something which is problematic when it comes to security and intelli-
gence. Nonetheless, it serves to emphasise a subtle distinction between openness and 
accountability.  While its origins lie in (public) oversight, as it has come to be under-
stood, open government is about collaboration and improved services at least as much 
as scrutiny (Chun et al, 2010) and, importantly for this examination, implies the positive 
acquiescence of government or its agencies to disclosure.  With this distinction in mind, 
comparisons with the ISC can be made.  
ISC AS A COMMITTEE OF PARLIAMENT 
The different contextual changes discussed herein can be seen to be at least partly re-
sponsible for recent developments in openness in relation to Britain's security and intel-
ligence services viewed in terms of ‘parliamentary’ disclosure.  The Intelligence and 
Security Committee, which is charged with scrutinising the agencies, is constitutionally 
abnormal having been established as a statutory body of parliamentarians appointed by 
and answerable to the prime minister. This contrasts with Select Committees which are 
accountable directly to parliament.  Smaller in size than a Select Committee, its remit 
mirrors nonetheless those shadowing departmental activities, though it has met in secret 
session and based in the Cabinet Office rather than Westminster.  Recent changes result-
ing from the Justice and Security Act (2013) have seen the ISC become a Committee of 
Parliament.  With this, members are appointed by parliament (having been nominated 
by the prime minister) though are still subject to the Official Secrets Act (Dawson, 
2013). Moreover, the Committee was given greater access to information, including 
‘primary material’, enjoyed greater resourcing and saw its remit stretch into ‘all intelli-
gence and security activities of Government, including parts of the Cabinet Office, the 
Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism in the Home Office, and DI’. (ISC, 2013, 
43). The process also works partially in reverse when compared to the Select Commit-
tess since the ISC consults with the agencies before it puts information in  the public 
domain. The process is explained in the annual report: ‘The Agencies have to demon-
strate clearly how publication of the material in question would be damaging before the 
Committee agrees to redact it’ (ISC, 2016, 3).  This all represents an advance in open 
government as well as accountability.  
While significant, this development is perhaps not uncharacteristic since there is now an 
established history of piecemeal openness which goes back to the early 1990s. Indeed 
early steps were taken by the agencies themselves including public appearances by the 
Director-General of MI5, declassification of historic records, visible new headquarters 
along the Thames and websites all ‘designed to present an image of greater openness 
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and accountability’. (Defty, 2008, 622).  Since then, ISC activities themselves have rep-
resented greater openness having moved from operating in secret but reporting to Par-
liament to an annual Commons debate after 1997, to the historic decision to hold evi-
dence sessions in public in 2013.  Nonetheless, the difference should not be understated 
since initial openness, compelled by the European Court,  had been intended to ‘elimi-
nate unnecessary secrecy and identify the key players, but not to make them significant 
public figures’ (West, 2005, 30). This coincided with the longer trend towards Parlia-
ment taking greater advantage of its sovereign authority to demand answers from all 
areas of public life.  It suggests that once government commits to openness, momentum 
gathers behind greater transparency as objections are gradually eroded.  
This section makes the case that while the ISC's activities can be judged as less demo-
cratically legitimate than those of the departmental Select Committees and less effective 
at holding the executive to account, recent developments can be viewed as being more 
about open government.  But more than this, given that new insights into the intelli-
gence services resulted from a process of negotiation and agreement, even though the 
power of the ISC remains muted, the practice can also be said to more closely resemble 
open government than the more focussed accountability of Select Committee hearings. 
The direction of travel could see this change.  
 
Opening Up Dullness 
The ISC has been subject to unfavourable comparisons with the Select Committees and 
its weakness highlighted most convincingly by failure to ask awkward questions about 
the invasion of Iraq.  This criticism continued more recently in response to instability in 
Syria. Reprieve director Clair Algar claimed that despite ‘its purported role in providing 
scrutiny and oversight of the intelligence services, it is in fact far more often a cheer-
leader than a watchdog.’ (Algar, 2013).  A perusal over the ISC’s annual reports (for 
instance ISC, 2016) lends credence to this view as does the public questioning of spy 
chiefs in November 2013.  
Introducing the first open hearing, Chairman Sir Malcolm Rifkind described this as ‘a 
very significant step forward in the transparency of our Intelligence Agencies.’ (ISC, 
2013b). Indeed, the session which ran for an hour and a half and broadcast with a short 
delay, involved wide ranging questions for Lobban, Parker and Sawers including tech-
nology and the cyber threat, global co-operation, practical operational considerations, 
terrorism, agency powers and balance with liberty.  While historic, the session was 
hardly sensational with little new learned about the activities of the services.  The style 
of questioning was firm but scarcely demanding, particularly when one contrasts with 
the Home Affairs Committee’s robust questioning subsequently of Alan Rusbridger, 
editor of The Guardian which had published Snowden’s leaks. (HAC, 2013). It can be 
observed that such output is consistent with the understated and dull style of the ISC’s 
published reports since its establishment (Gill & Phythian, 2006, ch8). Indeed, the ISC 
does not see its role as creating headlines but rather ‘providing reassurance’ (Defty, 
2008, 639).   
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Despite comparisons with the more vigorous Select Committees, when one views the 
occasions when Parliament has taken an interest in the agencies (for example Iraq) it has 
tended to be due to some event which has come to public attention.  This is of course 
the nature of secrecy but it does not sit comfortably with the idea of open government. 
In this sense, while the ISC’s role is to scrutinise, it is a step removed from the sover-
eign responsibility to represent voters.  The Committee and its members are of and 
trusted by government and its intelligence agencies.  This makes their activities much 
more closely aligned to the idea of openness.  
Furthermore, the ‘trusted’, insider, status of the ISC can be finessed.  In its own report 
the Committee contrasts itself with the rest of Westminster: ‘Unlike other parts of Gov-
ernment, intelligence and security matters cannot be effectively scrutinised in Parlia-
mentary debates, or by a normal departmental Select Committee, the media, academia 
or pressure groups. Only a body with powers to access highly classified information can 
fulfil such a role.’ (ISC, 2013, 42).  A further distinction is raised here in that the ISC 
still enjoys privileged access to information and as such the genesis of its deliberations 
are not necessarily those of public or media comment.  And unlike the Select Commit-
tees, the ISC is not competing with other equally informed and impactful forums.  Its 
unique position is, therefore, guarded jealously.  Writing after seven years of operation, 
the first Chair of the ISC gives some sense of what that trusted status means: ‘There is 
obviously a need to balance what is a sensible level of oversight requirements and al-
lowing the intelligence agencies to perform in an effective and sensible way.’(King, 
2001, 26).  One only has to peruse the status and background of Chairs and members to 
realise that the ISC is filled with trusted establishment figured who have previously 
served in government and typically hold Privy Council status.  This contrasts with the 
makeup of typical select committees where more junior and oppositional politicians can 
be found.  
 
Effectiveness 
The ISC has proved itself to be ‘reliable’ for the executive and its investigations are 
notable for what they do not cover. Iraq has been mentioned but early on members 
chose not to examine historical issues and later ignored revelations published in the 
newspapers by disgruntled MI5 officer David Shayler that the services had investigated 
Labour ministers and that MI6 had been involved in a plot to assassinate Libya’s Colo-
nel Gadaffi without then Foreign Secretary (and later ISC chair) Malcolm Rifkind’s 
knowledge (Hollingsworth & Fielding, 1999).  It can be said that the ISC does not see 
its role as either forcing the security and intelligence services to justify their actions or 
indeed as a conduit of open government.  But in playing the part of trusted insider, it has 
furthered the cause of openness in this ‘secret’ area of government.  Indeed, while it is 
widely acknowledged to have underperformed in holding the agencies to account, its 
greatest service has been to opening up government by publishing some of the infor-
mation to which it has privileged access and extending its remit further into govern-
ment.  Moreover, its relative ineptness goes to the heart of the balance between legiti-
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macy and effectiveness central to academic critiques of democratic oversight (Gill & 
Phythian, 2006).  
The secret nature of the intelligence services means that it is impossible to judge the 
impact of scrutiny other than to observe that the agencies have not been subject to the 
public interrogation that has befallen other arms of government.  Furthermore, Worthy’s 
(2010) critique of Freedom of Information concludes that while transparency has in-
creased, broader objectives of widening participation, enhancing decision making and 
improving trust have met with limited success.  Openness can increase mistrust in gov-
ernment as reporting of new information is customarily negative.  For similar reasons, 
Bannister and Connolly (2012) argue that transparency can be ‘inimical’ to good gov-
ernance requiring careful management.  Given the additional limits surrounding the ac-
tivities of security and intelligence, this might be said to apply more pointedly to MI5, 
MI6 and GCHQ whatever the intention of Parliamentary oversight and are areas for 
future research.  
CONCLUSION 
Parliamentary scrutiny is not the only form of accountability but it is the most demo-
cratically legitimate.  In the case of the Security and Intelligence Services, a significant 
amount of cooperation is required for it to work. This is broadly what has happened 
since the agencies and their oversight were put on a statutory footing.  This article has 
been limited in its coverage of the opening up of the services but in viewing the devel-
opment of accountability has contributed to the understanding  of parliament’s role in 
‘open government’.  In most areas of government, parliament no longer has a monopoly 
on information and yet its Select Committees’ new found confidence has seen it use that 
data to hold the executive to account much more effectively. The constitutionally ab-
normal nature of the ISC, however, much more clearly resembles open government 
since it is both ‘trusted’ by the state and it still enjoys privileged access by acquies-
cence.  
One can only speculate as to the future given recent moves to increase the ISC’s legiti-
macy by making it a Committee of Parliament.  The changes in the 2013 Act, which 
included Parliament’s right to appoint members nominated by the prime minister, did 
not alter the inherited composition of the ISC. Changes in personnel since have been 
very much in the traditional mould of trusted, establishment, insider including its latest 
Chair, former Attorney General Dominic Grieve QC, PC.  Nonetheless, the increased 
status of Westminster’s departmental Select Committees present new career paths –and 
status - for parliamentarians.   
The context is compounded by the impact of technology and the new ‘WikiLeaks 
world’ which means that rogue actors are increasingly able to put classified data into the 
public domain.  This could weaken the ISC’s claim to privileged information as ‘tech-
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nology makes it more and more difficult to take secretive decisions at any scale’ 
(Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012, 301).  The trend is clearly in the direction of more robust par-
liamentary questioning which will make scrutiny more legitimate.  Should the relation-
ship change, however, accountability’s gain could well be open government’s loss.  
Notes 
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